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The rising prevalence of Social Networking Sites (SNS) and their usage in multiple contexts
poses new privacy challenges and increasingly prompts users to manage their online
identity. To address privacy threats stemming from interacting with other users on SNS,
effective Social Identity Management (SIdM) is a key requirement. It refers to the deliberate
and targeted disclosure of personal attribute values to a subset of one’s contacts or other
users on the SNS. Protection against other entities such as the site operator itself or ad-
vertisers and application programmers is not covered by SIdM, but could be incorporated in
further refinement steps. Features and settings to perform SIdM have been proposed and
subsequently implemented partly by some SNS. Yet, these are often isolated solutions that
lack integration into a reference framework that states the requirements for successfully
managing one’s identity. In this article, such a reference framework of existing and desired
SIdM settings is derived from identity theory, literature analysis, and existing SNS. Based
thereupon, we examine the SIdM capabilities of prevalent SNS and highlight possible im-
provements. Lastly, we reason about developing a metric to objectively compare the
capability of SNS in regards to their support for SIdM.
ª 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction The need for settings that enable personal Social IdentitySocial Networking Sites (SNS) on the internet are of increasing
importance both in personal and professional life. According
to an often-cited definition, these sites, such as Facebook, allow
users to create personal profiles, express connections with
other users and traverse the resulting social graph (Boyd and
Ellison, 2007). Through their rising pervasiveness and the
use of sensitive data such as geospatial information, SNS have
also prompted privacy concerns. Besides the often discussed
SNS providers’ handling of user data, privacy concerns also
need to consider the user’s contacts (Ziegele and Quiring,
2011).i.uni-regensburg.de (M.
. Pernul).
r M, et al., Analyzing se
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ier Ltd. All rights reservedManagement (SIdM) has been pointed out by multiple authors
(Farnham and Churchill, 2011; Lipford et al., 2009). SIdM refers
to the deliberate, targeted disclosure of personal attribute
values to a subset of one’s contacts on SNS. From a social
science perspective, the need for SIdM stems from each indi-
vidual performingmultiple and potentially conflicting roles in
everyday life (Goffman, 1959). To keep a consistent self-image,
audiences for each role performance need to be segregated in
a way that people from one audience cannot witness a role
performance that is intended for another audience. Main-
taining consistent self-images is also referred to as contextual
integrity (Nissenbaum, 2010).Riesner), michael.netter@wiwi.uni-regensburg.de (M. Netter),
ttings for social identity management on Social Networking
formation Security Technical Report (2013), http://dx.doi.org/
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tacts into audiences for later attribute disclosure have previ-
ously been described in detail (van den Berg and Leenes, 2010).
Often, such settings have subsequently been implemented by
SNS. For instance, automated proposal of homogenous audi-
ences was presented in (Netter et al., 2011) and has later been
adopted by SNS.
While being described in several publications and imple-
mented partially, SIdM settings are hard to classify and to
compare across various SNS. Moreover, it is a difficult task to
evaluate an SNS’ overall capabilities regarding SIdM. This is
due to semantic differences of the information posted on SNS,
and subsequently, of the particular SIdM settings. There are
publications that apply access control models to SNS
(Carminati et al., 2011), which provide an exact description of
a usually fictional SNS’ SIdM settings. While providing an ac-
curate and precise description of a desired access control
scheme, they are however often hardly applicable to the re-
ality of current SNS (Grimmelmann, 2009). These issues un-
derline the need for a provider-independent reference
framework to compare existing and future SNS regarding their
SIdM capabilities.
This article is an extended version of a paper that was
accepted to the ARES-conference in 2012 (Riesner et al., 2012).
It has been extended under consideration of the helpful
reviewer comments and the discussion at the conference
venue. Its contribution is twofold: First, we analyze literature
related to SIdM settings as well as settings that are imple-
mented in established SNS. Then, we derive a reference
framework for existing and desired SIdM settings. The
framework is suitable to analyze and compare the extent to
which SNS support SIdM and is based on four high-level re-
quirements for SIdM. In this extended version, the connection
between the literature and the requirements is expressed in
more detail. Also, the settings themselves are described more
thoroughly. Secondly, we evaluate a set of selected SNS using
the reference framework to demonstrate its applicability and
to highlight possible improvements of their SIdM settings.
Lastly, in this extended version, we propose an approach for
developing a metric to quantify the SNS’ support for SIdM.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. After
describing related work in Section 2, Section 3 addresses our
research approach. In Section 4 we derive general re-
quirements for SIdM from literature. In Section 5 we develop a
reference framework for SIdM settings by matching these re-
quirements with particular SIdM settings that are already
implemented in SNS and discuss desirable advancements.
Section 6 surveys selected SNS using the reference frame-
work. We discuss a metric for assessing the SIdM capabilities
of an SNS in Section 7, followed by the conclusion of the article
in Section 8.2. Related work
Multiple authors argue that privacy is a growing concern as
SNS usage has increased over the years (Irani et al., 2009;
Borcea-Pfitzmann et al., 2011). Two major threats to privacy
can be distinguished, stemming either from SNS service pro-
viders or other SNS users (Ziegele and Quiring, 2011). ThisPlease cite this article in press as: Riesner M, et al., Analyzing se
Sites: Classification, current state, and proposed developments, In
10.1016/j.istr.2013.02.005article focuses on the latter, which aims at managing social
identities consistently to avoid privacy breaches. While this
bears resemblance to managing different appearances of the
self in the real world, research shows that it is difficult to
transfer real-world strategies to the online world (Tufekci,
2008) due to inherent properties of mediated communication
such as persistence and searchability.
To mitigate these issues, a variety of identity management
and access control concepts have been published. A proto-
typical SNS that allows for creating multiple personas and
audiences is shown (Leenes et al., 2010). Furthermore, SNS-
specific access control models have been proposed that aim
at improving targeted sharing of personal information
(Carminati et al., 2011; Ali et al., 2007; Netter et al., 2012). Other
works aim at aiding the users in their social identity man-
agement, for instance by suggesting contact groups for
disclosure (Fang and LeFevre, 2010; Netter et al., 2011) or by
automatically anonymizing unstructured texts and water-
marking it to detect unauthorized disclosures (Nguyen-Son
et al., 2012). While these works make valuable suggestions
for the improvement of SNS’ SIdM capabilities, this work fo-
cuses on structuring SIdM settings and evaluating the current
SNS support for SIdM.
Studying the usage of privacy settings is another related
research area. Publications focus on aspects such as quanti-
fying incorrect privacy settings (Liu et al., 2011; Netter et al.,
2013; Madejski et al., Mar. 2012), examining to which extent
users understand privacy settings and their impact (Strater
and Lipford, 2008), assessing usage strategies of privacy set-
tings (Kelley et al., 2011; Watson et al., 2012), and predicting
user attitudes from privacy settings (Lewis et al., 2008). In
contrast, this work takes amore abstract point of view, aiming
to determine the settings required to conduct successful SIdM.
From a practical perspective, SNS service providers have
introduced a variety of settings, for example to limit the visi-
bility of one’s profile. Bonneau and Preibusch (2009) examine
privacy settings of several SNS with regard to visibility and
access controls, but their focus is much wider than SIdM and
several of the settings identified in our work were not
addressed. In another work (Ulbricht and Abraham, 2012),
privacy settings are analyzed from a service provider point of
view, while in contrast this work takes a user perspective.
Krishnamurthy and Wills (2008) cluster personal information
on SNS and discuss differences in privacy controls between
several SNS regarding these clusters. Settings regarding in-
formation disclosure to contacts play only aminor role in their
work andmost of the advanced SIdM features discussed in our
work were not implemented at the time of their publication.
Additionally, a taxonomy to describe social networking data
in privacy discussions has been introduced (Schneier, 2010). A
legal analysis of privacy settings is provided by Kuczerawy
et al. (2011).
Our work differs from the aforementioned works due to its
clear focus on SIdM, which concerns the information disclo-
sure to online contacts. Also the discussed SIdM settings are
aligned by a reference framework which is based on well-
defined requirements that need to be fulfilled for successful
SIdM. Additional related work regarding social identity man-
agement is discussed in Section 4, which aims at elicitating
requirements from literature.ttings for social identity management on Social Networking
formation Security Technical Report (2013), http://dx.doi.org/
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Our research is based on the model shown in Fig. 1. First, we
derive high-level requirements for SIdM from literature,
which is described inmore detail in Section 4 (step (1) in Fig. 1).
Relevant literature includes work from other research areas
that can be applied to SNS, for instance social identity theory
from the social sciences. Publications that propose improve-
ments for the SIdM that is implemented in current SNS are
also part of the analysis.
Step (2) is presented in Section 5 and aims at deriving a
reference framework for particular SIdM settings and features
that can be implemented in SNS. For each high-level
requirement from Section 4, we identify and describe corre-
sponding SIdM settings or features that are suitable to satisfy
it. The origins of these features vary: Mostly they were
observed as implemented on one or more of the existing SNS.
Other settings and features were proposed in analyzed liter-
ature or, as a result of the analysis, by the authors of this work
as a possible solution to improve fulfillment of the previously
stated high-level requirements.
The particular settings and features for SIdM are grouped
by the high-level requirements presented in Section 4,
resulting in a structured catalog. It forms a reference frame-
work that is suitable for the evaluation of the extent to which
particular SNS support SIdM. Thus the contribution of this
work lies not only in presenting particular settings necessary
for SIdM, but also in a reference framework that can be
adapted to future developments, for instance the introduction
of new SIdM features.
Our approach is to make the reference framework inde-
pendent of particular SNS implementations while describing
SIdM settings in a fashion that makes them applicable to
current and future SNS. While an accurate and precise
description is necessary to enable a clear decisionwhether the
setting is provided by an SNS or not, the descriptionmust also
be fairly generic to be widely applicable.
Further in Section 6, we apply the reference framework to a
selected number of SNS to evaluate and compare their sup-
port for SIdM, leading to a qualitative assessment (3). This is
exemplified in Fig. 1 through pie-symbols which indicate the
degree of fulfillment for a certain SIdM feature. This analysis
serves as a validation for the developed reference framework.
It allows to draw conclusions on whether the identified SIdM
settings and their descriptions are actually applicable or if
there is need for adjustment. Thus, the approach has an
iterative character allowing for further improvement and forFig. 1 e Research model.
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extending our research by developing a metric to analyze the
SIdM support of SNS quantitatively.4. SIDM requirements from literature
In this section, we derive requirements for SIdM from litera-
ture. Note that while it is difficult to arrive at an exhaustive list
of requirements, we are confident to cover themost important
aspects regarding SIdM. This will be the basis for a subsequent
analysis of SIdM functionality in SNS as presented in Section
5. This analysis is decoupled from actually implemented SIdM
features to avoid limitations that would arise from only
looking at the status quo.
Revisiting SIdM, it can be regarded as a concept thatmainly
builds upon two theories: Social identity and privacy theory.
While the former refers to conveying a favorable image of the
self to a particular audience, the latter aims to present a
consistent self-image. In the following, the theoretical foun-
dations of both theories are outlined, constituting the basis for
elicitating requirements for successful SIdM.
Identity theory consists of a variety of theories to describe
the construction and management of social identities. From
an interactionist perspective, identities are constructed and
reshaped through interaction with other people. According to
Goffman’s (1959) concept of impression management, a per-
son performs different roles to present an image of the self
which is favorable for the current situation. A controlled self-
representation involves two parties, namely the individual
performing a particular role and an audience which reacts to
the performance (Bilbow and Yeung, 2010). To adapt one’s
performance to an audience, impression management allows
for having multiple, potentially conflicting roles that are
bound to different social contexts. This conceptualization of
identity can be applied to SNS since the primary functions of
these sites are impression- and relationship management
(Boyd and Ellison, 2007).
Besides impression management, a major focus of SIdM is
on privacy, i.e. to present an image of the self which is
appropriate in a given context and to respect the social norms
of this situation. In more detail, privacy here refers to
Nissenbaum’s (2010) concept of contextual integrity, making a
distinction between appropriateness and distribution of
shared personal information. Privacy is violated if either of
both terms is ignored. Appropriateness refers to only
disclosing personal information which is acceptable in the
current situation, taking existing social norms and present
people into consideration. For instance, information shared
with fellow students may be inappropriate when talking with
one’s grandparents. By distribution, the author states that
privacy is violated if shared personal information leaves its
intended context and becomes available in another context,
e.g. by health-related information appearing in a work
context. In the following, we derive requirements for SIdM in
SNS based on this conceptualization (Table 1).
As shown in the previous paragraphs, identities are con-
structs rather than ready-made essences (PrimeLife, 2010),
which are shaped in social interaction with others. Thus, an
essential requirement for successful social identityttings for social identity management on Social Networking
formation Security Technical Report (2013), http://dx.doi.org/
Table 1 e High-level requirements for SIDM derived from literature.
No. Requirement Sources
1 Unrestricted identity creation and control (Goffman, 1959; Agre and Rotenberg, 1998; Rouvroy, 2008)
2 Create and maintain multiple representations of the self (Goffman, 1959; Peterson, 2010; DiMicco and Millen, 2007;
Binder et al., 2009)
3 Create and maintain multiple social circles (Goffman, 1959; Lampinen et al., 2009; Palen and Dourish, 2003)
4 Contact permission assignment (Farnham and Churchill, 2011; Tufekci, 2008; Peterson, 2010;
Mayer-Scho¨nberger, 2009)
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tity creation and control over the presentation of self on a spe-
cific platform ((1) in Table 1). From a privacy perspective, Agre
and Rotenberg (1998) argue that privacy can be seen as “(.) the
freedom from unreasonable constraints on the construction of one’s
own identity.” In more detail, it “(.) protects lawful, but unpop-
ular, lifestyles against social pressures to conform to dominant social
norms. Privacy as freedom from unreasonable constraints in the
construction of one’s identity, serves to prevent or combat the ‘tyr-
anny of the majority’.” (Rouvroy, 2008) On a technical level, the
user should be able to use both predefined and custom per-
sonal attributes and their values and be able to change them
to reshape his identity. Additionally, the user should be able to
approve or deny non-user generated content that relates to
his identity such as links to his identity on pictures uploaded
by others. Also,means to view one’s representation of self as it
appears to others are necessary.
A second requirement results from the fact that people act
in different roles to adapt themselves to different social situ-
ations. Similarly, SNS evolve from single- to multi-purpose
platforms, where contacts from different social contexts are
present at the same platform (DiMicco and Millen, 2007). As a
result, the problem of conflicting social spheres emerges
(Binder et al., 2009), stating that it is difficult to simultaneously
meet the expectations of multiple audiences. For instance, in
terms of Goffman’s impression management, at the same
time playing the role of a caring husband, a professionally
acting employee, and a capricious friend on a single SNS
might be difficult. Hence, the requirement for being able to
create and maintain multiple representations of the self (2) gains
importance. In more detail, users of SNS should be given the
possibility to create an arbitrary number of partial identities,
also known as personas on the same platform (Peterson,
2010). Additionally, users should be able to keep these iden-
tities separated if desired as some identities might be con-
flicting. For instance, in a personal social setting, one might
wish to appear more outgoing than in a strictly professional
setting, and the attributes chosen for each situation may be
contradictory.
Based on Goffman’s conceptualization, identities are
selected according to the situation a user is currently in, which
is to a large extent defined by present people. Thus, a further
requirement for social identitymanagement in SNS is to create
and maintain multiple social circles (3) which are both the audi-
ence and the decision-making basis for choosing an appro-
priate identity (Lampinen et al., 2009). Within an SNS, it
should be possible to partition the user’s contacts into
different, potentially overlapping groups (Peterson, 2010).Please cite this article in press as: Riesner M, et al., Analyzing se
Sites: Classification, current state, and proposed developments, In
10.1016/j.istr.2013.02.005However, unlike in the real world, in SNS social circles are not
inherently present but instead only a single list of contacts
exists at the beginning (Palen and Dourish, 2003). Thus, there
is a need for assisting the user in grouping contacts into social
circles, which has been highlighted by several researchers
(Kelley et al., 2011; Madejski et al., 2011) and also implemented
in applied research (Netter et al., 2011).
Lastly, contact permission assignment (4) is a further require-
ment for social identity management that emerges due to the
fact that the majority of communication on SNS is asynchro-
nous and results in combining the notions of (2) and (3) to
govern access to the user’s online identities. On a technical
level, access control models are needed to map contacts to
personal attributes and assign permissions. SNS should pro-
vide means to enable the user to share different identity rep-
resentations with different contacts, i.e. provide read
permission to selected contacts for specific personal attribute
values (Farnham and Churchill, 2011). Note that for achieving
selective information disclosure, neither explicit modeling of
different identities (2) nor explicit expression of social circles
(3) is strictly necessary. Selective information disclosure can
still be achieved by assigning the visibility of certain attribute
values to single contacts. Upon closer examination, contact
permission assignment also extends to controls over how
others shape one’s identity. In SNS, settings formore extensive
permissions (e.g. write permissions) need to be in place, for
example to control comments by others on the user’s profile,
which might convey an unintended identity impression.
Unlike Goffman’s concept of role performances that can
only be witnessed by the present audience, the persistence of
personal information e an inherent property of digitally
mediated communication e shifts temporal and spatial
boundaries (Tufekci, 2008). In SNS, audiences can be distant,
invisible, and may exist in the future. However, Peterson ar-
gues that people rely on real-world heuristics to estimate
personal information distribution which leads to the need for
advanced controls for permission assignment for online SIdM
(Peterson, 2010). For example, SNS need to provide technical
means to allow for forgetting personal information as in the
real world, e.g. by automatically changing the visibility of in-
formation based on its age (Mayer-Scho¨nberger, 2009).5. Implemented and desirable settings to
fulfill SIDM requirements
Following our research model, in this section we match the
requirements derived in the previous section with particularttings for social identity management on Social Networking
formation Security Technical Report (2013), http://dx.doi.org/
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can be described as desirable advancements. Settings that are
not indicated as being introduced in this work or other liter-
ature were observed in current SNS.
Fig. 2 shows the scope of the requirements identified in
Section 4. It contains the main concepts within an SNS that
are of concern for the user who is conducting SIdM. Depic-
ted on the left hand side is the user’s profile, which can be
seen as the technical implementation of the user’s repre-
sentation of self. It may be broken down into personas that
are subsets of the profile and the technical pendent to par-
tial identities. Depicted on the right hand side are the user’s
contacts. Permissions governing the relationship between
profile content and contacts are shown in the middle of
Fig. 2. The user profile and permissions lie in the user-
manageable domain, meaning that the SNS user is in con-
trol over them. Also shown in the user-manageable domain
are representations for each contact that are used to assign
permissions.
Hence, all SIdM requirements derived in the previous
section concern the user-manageable domain. Even here,
user control may be limited by available settings within the
SNS. The user may be able to perform changes on other
contacts’ profiles as well, thus extending the user-
manageable domain beyond one’s own profile. This is how-
ever not depicted in Fig. 2 because this work is only con-
cerned with the management one’s own identity on SNS.
Changes made by the user in question would lie in the
manageable domain of the contact and is thus not relevant
here.
Note that corresponding to the term social identity man-
agement, this work is only concerned with managing one’s
online identity in regards to other users of the SNS. Further
actors such as the site operator, advertisers or application
providers are not explicitly considered. Yet, the model could
be extended to actors by considering them as a special type of
contact and analyzing whether SIdM settings are applicable to
them. It is however questionable whether SIdM controls pro-
vided by the site operator can reasonably protect against said
operator.
Each of the following subsections addresses one of the
requirements identified in Table 1. To describe in-
terdependencies between SIdM features, we use the following
relationships:User Profile
Persona 1 Attr. Value 1
Attr. Value 2
Persona 2 Attr. Value 3
Attr. Value 4
Cont
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10.1016/j.istr.2013.02.005 a refines b: the functionality of feature a refines that of
feature b and improves its quality. Feature b could function
without feature a, but not to its fullest extent.
 a extends b: the functionality of feature b is complemented
by feature a, but the quality of feature a would not be
compromised by the absence of b.
 a is alternative for b: feature a replaces the compete or
partial functionality of feature b, however not necessarily
with the same quality.
5.1. Unrestricted identity creation and control
SIdM settings and related properties regarding unrestricted
identity creation and control describe to what extent users are
able to create and shape their SNS profile and to control its
contents as they wish. We acknowledge that there are always
limitations to the extent that the users’ may shape their on-
line representation, possibly not only through restrictions by
the SNS, but also by technical boundaries, such as bandwidth
and screen resolution.
We see the user’s SNS profile as the set of all properties or
attribute values of that user in the SNS that may be disclosed
to contacts or other entities. Table 2 identifies four SIdM set-
tings directly related to the user’s control over the attributes
within the profile.
First, the user should be the final authority over each at-
tribute’s value (Setting 1a). This concerns especially user data
that is not deliberately entered by the user. For instance, the
SNS platform may automatically add information to the pro-
file based on user activity. Other limitations occur when there
is only a predefined set of possible values for an attribute, or
when the values have to be verified. Related to this property is
the possibility of users leaving the attribute values empty as
they wish (1b). Table 2 denotes the scope for which a setting is
applicable: Settings 1a and 1b for instance may not be avail-
able for all attributes in the SNS. Instead it is possible that they
are only available for certain attributes. The availability of the
following settings 1c and 1d on the other hand does not have
to be defined for each attribute. Also, dependencies between
available settings are denoted in the rightmost column of the
table. Setting 1b is refined in 1a, because one doesn’t have
complete control over an attribute value if it can’t be set as
empty.
It is conceivable that the control over one’s representation
of self exceeds merely filling out predefined fields that areact Representation
c4
c5
c1
c3
l Circle 1
Contacts
c3
c4
c2
c5
c1
l Circle 2
Requirement (3)
Create and maintain
multiple social circles
c2
nts and settings analysis.
ttings for social identity management on Social Networking
formation Security Technical Report (2013), http://dx.doi.org/
Table 2 e Settings for requirement 1: unrestricted identity creation and control.
No. SIdM setting or feature Availability Scope/target Dependency
1a User has control over attribute value Yes/no For each attribute Refined by 1b,
extended by 1ced
1b User may leave attribute value empty Yes/no For each attribute Refines 1a
1c User may define and use custom attribute types Yes/no User profile Extends 1a
1d User may view how profile appears to others Yes/no User profile Extends 1a
i n f o rm a t i on s e c u r i t y t e c hn i c a l r e p o r t x x x ( 2 0 1 3 ) 1e1 46provided by the SNS. While creating one’s profile completely
from scratch similarly to a personal web page is not feasible in
a structured environment such as an SNS, we suggest that
control over one’s online representation could be increased
through users being able to freely add custom attribute types
to their profile (1c).
As stated before, depending on the SNS, settings 1a and 1b
may only be available for some attributes. It is also possible in
particular SNS that a setting is only available for certain
attribute categories. This possible dependence between
available SIdM settings and the implementation of certain
attributes in a particular SNS merits further analysis of the
implementation of profile elements for each SNS (Riesner and
Pernul, 2012). As such an analysis is very implementation-
dependent, it is performed together with the provider survey
in Section 6, where necessary.
Lastly, for control over their profile, users also need to be
able to view whether their settings and modifications were
applied as desired (1d). This concerns settings regarding
attribute types and values as well as the disclosure settings
that are discussed further below. Also known as privacy lens
(Aı¨meur et al., 2010) or mirror, the related SIdM feature shows
how the user’s profile appears from the point of view of
others, such as a particular contact or the public.
5.2. Create and maintain multiple representations of self
Creatingmultiple representations of self refers to allowing the
user to perform several roles on a single SNS in order to adapt
to different social situations. In SNS, such roles could be
implemented through personaswhichwe see as a subset of all
attribute values of a user profile in a given SNS. Table 3 lists
three SIdM settings to achieve multiple personas in an SNS.
Setting 2a is the most exhaustive one and uses the explicit
construct of a persona (Leenes et al., 2010). It allows users toTable 3 e Settings for requirement 2: create and maintain mul
No. SIdM setting or feature A
2a User may allocate attribute values freely to personas Yes/lim
person
2b Implicit multiple representations of self through
selective disclosure of attribute values
Yes/no
2c User may disclose different values for the same
attribute to different contacts
Yes/no
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10.1016/j.istr.2013.02.005create multiple personas by grouping attribute values. We see
its scope as being dependent on the attributes, as it may be
possible to allocate only some of one’s attributes to personas
while other attributes remain part of a base-persona that
cannot be shared selectively. A further possible restriction
may lie in the number of personas that one is able to create.
Even when the construct of dedicated personas is not
available, multiple representations of self may be achieved
implicitly through selecting the target audience for each in-
dividual attribute value (Setting 2b). Here, the availability of
the settingmay also not be available for all attributes, thus the
scope is again defined as for each attribute.
Setting 2c extends the former settings by explicitly
addressing the possibility to disclose different, possibly con-
tradictory values for the same attribute.
Currently, the most prevalent way of achieving multiple
representations of self consists of utilizing SIdM setting 2b or,
if unavailable, through creating multiple accounts at one or
more SNS. Note that this section only addresses the content
that is to be disclosed. The actual disclosure has to consider
the granularity of available access control settings, possible
audiences and is discussed in the first two items of Section 5.4.
5.3. Create and maintain multiple social circles
The selective disclosure of personas or only a subset of one’s
attribute values as discussed in the previous section requires
means to determine to whom such profile elements should be
disclosed to.
One construct to specify such an audience for one’s attri-
bute values is grouping one’s contacts into social circles which
can in turn be used for selective attribute disclosure. It is
denoted by SIdM setting 3a in Table 4. The target for this
setting is the set of the user’s contacts. Similar to the number
of personas, it is conceivable that the number of social circlestiple representations of the self.
vailability Scope/target Dependency
ited number of
as/no
For each attribute Extended by 2c, refines 4b
For each attribute Partial alternative for 2a,
extended by 2c, refines 4b
For each attribute Extends 2a, 2b
ttings for social identity management on Social Networking
formation Security Technical Report (2013), http://dx.doi.org/
Table 4 e Settings for requirement 3: create and maintain multiple social circles.
No. SIdM setting or feature Availability Scope/target Dependency
3a User may group contacts to form
social circles
Yes/limited number of circles/no Contacts Refined by 3b,
extended by 3c,
refines 4aed
3b Social circles may overlap Yes/no Circles Refines 3a, 4aed
3c SNS assists user with creating
circles
Yes: smart list suggestions/yes:
attribute-based lists/yes: advanced
user interfaces/no
Contacts, circles Extends 3a, 4d
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construct to create social circles, groups of contacts that are
able to view the same attribute values can be considered as
implicit social circles or audiences. An example for the friend
list management on the site Facebook is illustrated in Fig. 3.
Setting 3b denotes whether social circles may overlap,
meaning that one contact may be the member of two or more
circles. Such a feature would extend the expressiveness of
setting 3a by allowing users to express that some of their
contacts are part of multiple areas of their life. If overlapping
circles are not available in the SNS, the users may resort to
creating a third circle consisting of those contacts that are part
of both existing circles and disclosing attributes accordingly.
Finally, as nowadays many SNS users have several hun-
dred contacts (Kelley et al., 2011), grouping all of them into
circles may become a tedious task. Setting 3c indicates
whether the SNS provides means to assist the user with
allocating contacts to circles. There are multiple possible
means of assistance. Sophisticated approaches suggest com-
plete contact lists to the user based on the contacts’ attributes
or relationships among them (Netter et al., 2011). Intuitive
user interfaces such as advanced visualizations of one’s cir-
cles or drag and drop-commands can also be considered as
assistance for grouping contacts. Fig. 4 shows the approach onFig. 3 e Friend lists on Facebook.
Please cite this article in press as: Riesner M, et al., Analyzing se
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10.1016/j.istr.2013.02.005the site Googleþ, employing a dynamic visualization of social
circles in conjunction with a drag and drop interface.5.4. Contact permission assignment
Building on the previous two subsections and referring to
requirement 4 in Table 1, we discuss SIdM settings allowing
the allocation between permissions and contacts or other
entities in this section. First, we introduce possible targets for
the assignment of permissions beyond the previously dis-
cussed social circles. Then we analyze permissions, which
refer to contacts being allowed either to read or to manipu-
late certain attribute values in the user’s manageable
domain. This is followed by a discussion of advanced con-
trols for permission assignment. The settings are summa-
rized in Table 5.
5.4.1. Possible targets for permissions
Permissions to read or modify attribute values in the user’s
profile may not only be assigned to social circles as discussed
in Section 5.3. Fig. 5 shows further possible settings for targets
that permissions can be assigned to. They are ordered from
very large audiences to small ones.
The broadest and least restrictive setting is all internet users,
making the permission available to the public. The setting all
SNS users grants the permission only to registered users of the
SNS, which is of marginal difference, as signing up at most
SNS is free. Still, it may prevent automated requests by searchFig. 4 e Social circles in GoogleD.
ttings for social identity management on Social Networking
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Table 5 e Settings for requirement 4: contact permission assignment.
No. SIdM setting or feature Availability Scope/target Dependency
4a Possible targets for permissions
(set T )
Refer to Fig. 5 Users of the SNS and
the public
Refined by 3aeb, extended
by 3c, refines 4b
4b Fine grained sharing decisions
for attribute values A
SD ¼ {A  T}, consider restrictions Sharing decisions Refined by 4a, 3aeb, 2a, 2c,
extended by 4eef
4c Control how contacts can
shape the user’s profile
T  {allow, individual approval, deny} Permission granting
decisions (modifications)
Refined by 3aeb,
extended by 3c
4d Control incoming references
to the user’s profile
T  {allow, individual approval, deny} Permission granting
decisions (incoming
references)
Refined by 3aeb,
extended by 3c
4e Time-based sharing decisions No/expiry date for posted items/tool to
delete older items (for each attribute)
Granted permissions
to view attributes
Extends 4b
4f Limit the number of accesses of
information items
Yes/no (for each attribute) Granted permissions
to view attributes
Extends 4b
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may be granted to other users based on their attributes, for
instance their place of education. However, it has to be
considered that an access control decision based on attributes
of the subjects is potentially weak, if they are able to change
such attributes themselves. Hence it has to be considered
whether there are means of verification for such attributes or
if they can be chosen freely by the other user.
The friend of a friend (FoaF)-setting grants a permission to all
contacts of the user’s contacts. It may be extended further, for
instance to contacts of the second or third degree. These
broadest possible settings assign permissions to other entities
beyond the user’s set of contacts. The latter two settings limit
that number of entities to a certain degree. Yet, it is beyond
the user’s control, which individuals in particular are actually
granted a permission and using these settings, it is unlikely to
anticipate the exact set of individuals that are granted a
permission.
As shown in Fig. 5, we suggest a setting friends of some
friends to reduce the reach of the regular FoaF-Setting. Using
such a setting, the user could define a very limited set of
contacts whose contacts are then granted the permission in
turn. The regular FoaF on the other hand, would grant the
permission to the contacts of all of the user’s contacts.All Internet Users
All SNS Users
Attribute-based Set of 
Users
Friends of Friends
All Contacts
Subsets of Contacts
Only Self
Deleted
*Proposed S
Friends of
Grouping of 
Fig. 5 e Possible target
Please cite this article in press as: Riesner M, et al., Analyzing se
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10.1016/j.istr.2013.02.005The setting granting permissions to all contacts is very
common and often the predefined disclosure setting. How-
ever, with users having more than a hundred contacts, such a
setting grants permissions to a very broad group of individuals
and the probability of unintended information disclosure
rises.
The user has even more control when granting a permis-
sion only to subsets of her contacts. Defining such subsetsmay
be performed either manually or using constructs like social
circles as discussed in Section 5.3.
Another aspect that isn’t considered by currently imple-
mented settings for information disclosure is the intended
audience for information that has been posted by the user’s
contacts. While current settings may allow the user to pre-
define a static audience for information posted by contacts,
this setting doesn’t consider by whom this information was
posted. This information may in fact be relevant, as infor-
mation posted by a contact may for instance only be intended
for contacts that are in the same circle. To incorporate this
information, we propose the settingwithin circle that limits the
visibility of such content only to contacts that are in the same
circle of the contact that created the content.
The settings only self and deleted don’t assign permissions to
any third entity and are shown for the sake of completenessetting
 some Friends*
Contacts possible
Overlapping 
Groups
Assisted Grouping
Within Circle*
(visibility)
s for permissions.
ttings for social identity management on Social Networking
formation Security Technical Report (2013), http://dx.doi.org/
1 Websites of the surveyed SNS: http://www.facebook.com,
http://www.twitter.com, https://plus.google.com, http://www.
linkedin.com and https://joindiaspora.com/; Survey conducted
on March 19e23, 2012.
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in the SNS.
5.4.2. Fine grained sharing decisions for attribute values
Fine-grained sharing decisions for attribute valuesmeans that
the user should be able to make decisions regarding the
disclosure of profile attributes with as few limitations and as
fine-grained as possible. To state this more precisely, we
introduce a set A containing all attribute values from the
user’s profile. If the construct of personas is available in the
SNS, they are also included in A. Next, consider a set T that
includes all targets for permissions that are available through
available SNS settings. For instance, if the SNS allows dis-
tinguishing between subsets of contacts, every contact is part
of T. If the construct of social circles is available, each circle is
also part of T.
Trivially, the disclosure settings are limited by the avail-
able items in A and T. But there may be even more limitations
regarding the sharing settings. Precisely, let us specify a set of
binary sharing decisions SD that can be enumerated by the
Cartesian product SD ¼ {A  T}. SD contains every possible
combination of an attribute value and a disclosure target. The
user has no limitations in her disclosure decisionswhen she is
able to make an individual, independent sharing decision for
every element in SD.
Such limitations may occur when the sharing decision for
elements in SD cannot be changed by the user. Inmost SNS for
instance, the profile picture is always set to be visible to the
public, thus the sharing decision for the tuple (profile picture, all
internet users) is always true and cannot be changed.
Further limitations occur when the decisions for several
elements in SD cannot be made separately, implying that a
sharing decision can only be applied to a group of attribute
values and not to individual values. For instance, in some SNS,
the visibility setting of comments made by contacts on a
certain item are inherited from that item and cannot be
modified separately. Note that some elements in SD are
dependent on other elements not due to restrictions posed by
the SNS, but because elements in A and T may intersect with
or include other elements.
5.4.3. Control how contacts shape the users profile
There are two possibilities of how contacts may shape the
user’s profile and thus her identity on SNS.
One of them are SNS-features that allow contacts to post
text messages or multimedia items to the user profile. Such
items may be posted independently or as a comment to an
existing object. SIdM settings determine whether a contact is
allowed to post items to the user profile. As stated by setting 4c
in Table 5, SIdM settings should enable the user to control
items posted to the user’s profile. If posted as a comment,
itemsmay inherit the visibility setting of the parent object. For
other posted items, treating them as regular attribute values
allows applying the line of thought presented in the previous
section.
Another way for contacts and even other users of the SNS
to shape the user’s online profile is by referencing it from
entries in their own profiles. Often also known as tagging or
linking, such a reference provides a shortcut to the user’s
profile, for example for identification of a person in a picture.Please cite this article in press as: Riesner M, et al., Analyzing se
Sites: Classification, current state, and proposed developments, In
10.1016/j.istr.2013.02.005As the reference is created in another user’s profile, it exists
outside of the user’s manageable domain and is not influ-
enced by visibility settings of the user that is referenced.
However, depending on the SNS, settings that prohibit other
users from creating incoming links may exist (4d). Incoming
references may be controlled indirectly by restricting direct
access for visitors of the user profile.
Note that due to the technical implementation of SNS, user
profiles are represented by alphanumerical strings and often
also by URLs that are accessible to at least all SNS users. Thus,
in most cases, SIdM settings cannot effectively prevent
creating incoming references on a technical level, but they can
reduce the convenience of doing it.
5.4.4. Advanced controls for permission assignment
We suggest the following advanced controls for permission
assignment to add additional dimensions to the user’s sharing
decisions.
As suggested in Section 4, time-based considerations may
play a role for sharing decisions, as information that was
added to the profile in the past may not accurately reflect the
user’s currently desired presentation of self. A strong SIdM
setting to incorporate the time-based dimension into sharing
decisions is to assign a (possibly default) expiration date to
eachattribute value that is added to theuser’s profile (4e). After
that date has passed, the attribute value is either removed or
the user is asked to extend its lifetime. A somewhat similar but
weaker, manually-invoked SIdM function that has been
implemented by Facebook, checks and possibly alters the
audience of posted items that have passed a certain age.
A further dimension that is conceivable to be incorporated
into sharing decisions would limit the number of times the
user profile may be accessed (4f). Such a setting could enable
other SNS-users to find and view the user’s profile for pur-
poses of identification and contact initiation. They would
however be prevented from repeatedlymonitoring that profile
without consent of the user. Note that information might be
copied while available, but advanced controls limit the gen-
eral availability of that information.6. Provider SIDM survey
We applied the reference framework presented in the previ-
ous section by surveying five selected SNS for SIdM support.1
We chose the SNS Facebook and Twitter due to their high
number of members and their international importance both
in the public perception and in academic publications.
Googleþwas selected due to its widely noticed introduction in
mid-2011 and its focus on privacy controls.While Googleþ and
Facebook can be classified as general purpose-SNS, LinkedIn
serves as an example for a smaller, still popular SNS that fo-
cuses on a particular topic, namely managing business re-
lationships. Finally, we chose Diaspora as a representative for
the decentralized SNS-paradigm. The survey results arettings for social identity management on Social Networking
formation Security Technical Report (2013), http://dx.doi.org/
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quirements for SIdM identified earlier.
Before we discuss the most interesting observations in the
study, we want to give a refined definition of the concept of
attributes and attribute values in conjunctionwith SNS. So far,
for simplification purposes, we used the term attribute value
uniformly to describe any information object within the user’s
profile. However, we also stated that there are differences in
how attributes are implemented within and between SNS. In
the survey we observed that in many cases the availability of
SIdM settings depends on how the attribute is implemented.
Thus, for a precise analysis of the SNS’ SIdM capabilities we
need to distinguish further between different attribute cate-
gories found in SNS.Table 6 e Survey of SNS and classification into the reference fr
No. Requirement/SIdM Setting or Feature
1 Unrestricted identity creation and control
1a User has completed control over attribute value
1b User may leave attribute value empty
1c User may define and use custom attributes types
1d User may view how profile appears to others
2 Create and maintain multiple representations of the self
2a User may allocate attribute values freely to personas
2b Implicit multiple representations of self through selective
disclosure of attribute values
2c User may disclose different value for the same attribute
to different contacts
3 Create and maintain multiple social circles
3a User may group contacts to form social circles
3b Social circles may overlap
3c SNS assists user with creating circles
4 Contact permission assignment
4a Possible targets for permissions (set T )
4b Fine grained sharing decisions for attribute values A
4c Control how contacts can shape the user’s profile
New item
Comment on existing item
4d Control incoming references to the user’s profile
4e Time-based sharing decision
4f Limit the number of accesses of information items
Support of SIdM setting or feature by SNS: full with minor limitatio
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10.1016/j.istr.2013.02.005We identified three major categories of attributes, which
are applicable to all surveyed SNS. First, single value-attributes
refer to a fixed attribute that is part of the user’s profile and
can be assigned at most one value. They are often used for
static information that changes only rarely or never such as
the user’s birthdate or elements of the address. On the other
hand, for multi value- attributes, the user may enter several
entries. Examples of multi value-attributes are lists of favorite
books or past employers.
In contrast to these two types, we see posted items, which
are not assigned to fixed regular attributes such as birthdate or
favorite books. Rather, for each user, there is a dynamic log of
posted items with new items being created at the top.
Depending on the SNS, posted items are for instance shortamework for SIdM.
Googleþ Diaspora LinkedIn Twitter Facebook
n/a n/a
n/a n/a n/a n/a
n/a
n/a
ns partial very limited none.
ttings for social identity management on Social Networking
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allow appending additional information such as the current
location, a reference to SNS users or comments.
6.1. Unrestricted identity creation and control
The surveyed SNS allow identity creation and control by the
user that is mostly unrestricted, albeit with a few exceptions.
Googleþ is slightly superior than the other sites mostly due to
more liberal requirements on mandatory attributes. Gener-
ally, users have complete control over their attribute values
among the surveyed SNS. Yet we observed that on Facebook,
editing one’s single- or multi value-attributes is automatically
announced to the contact by a corresponding posted item. It is
created for the user and has to be removed manually, if un-
desired. None of the SNS allow custom, user-defined attri-
butes, thus restricting the contents of the profile to the
predefined scheme.
6.2. Create and maintain multiple representations of the
self
Multiple representations of self, referring to the explicit cre-
ation and management of multiple personas, are not directly
supported by any of the surveyed SNS and can be achieved
implicitly at best. When performed through selective disclo-
sure of single- or multi value-attributes, it comes at the cost of
being only able to use at most one value (set) per attribute
among various personas. This is because none of the SNS
supports SIdM setting 2c, which refers to the ability to disclose
different values for the same attribute to different contacts.
Thus, at this time, creating andmaintaining complete distinct
and independent personas is only possible through creating
multiple SNS-accounts.
6.3. Create and maintain multiple social circles
The SNS support for managing multiple social circles is
generally better than that for multiple representations of self.
Googleþ, Diaspora and Facebook all provide constructs to
group contacts that may be used for later permission
assignment. The remaining SNS allow grouping contacts, but
the provided constructs cannot be used for SIdM purposes.
Only Facebook provides meaningful assistance for creating
social circles by automatically creating suggestions for often
used circles such as close friends and family. Also, contacts
that may fit into existing circles are suggested by the
platform.
6.4. Contact permission assignment
Googleþ and Facebook turned out to have the most fine
grained and least restrictive settings for contact permission
assignment. Regarding SIdM setting 4a, both provide a very
rich set of possible target settings for permission assignment.
Both miss however the two proposed target settings, within
circle and friends of some friends. LinkedIn lacks the ability of
assigning permissions only to subsets of one’s contacts, and
on Twitter, the only possible permission targets are the public
and approved followers.Please cite this article in press as: Riesner M, et al., Analyzing se
Sites: Classification, current state, and proposed developments, In
10.1016/j.istr.2013.02.005All surveyed SNS except LinkedIn force the username and
the profile picture to be visible to the public. Besides that,
Googleþ and Facebook have few limitations regarding sharing
decisions (Setting 4b). Both allow individual disclosure settings
for every single- and multi value-attribute as well as for each
posted item.There isnodistinct setting for eachvalueof amulti
value-attribute however. Comments inherit the visibility
setting of the posted item they were appended to and have no
distinct setting. Lacking the proposed permission target within
audience, comments and posted items from one audience are
visible to other audiences. This also applies to the contact list in
bothSNS,which canbe treatedasanother attributevalue in this
context: While the contact list may be disclosed only to certain
audiences, these audiences may then view all other contacts.
While the possible sharing decisions on Diaspora come
close to those on Googleþ and Facebook, they are very limited
on the remaining two SNS. On LinkedIn, this is due to the
inability to distinguish between subsets of one’s contacts for
attribute disclosure. On Twitter, the visibility can only be set
globally for all attributes and posted items (here known as
Tweets), lacking an individual setting for each posted item.
Regarding controls over how contactsmay shape the user’s
profile, we distinguish between items posted to the user pro-
file by contacts, comments on existing items, and references
pointing to the user profile. Only Facebook has a feature that
allows contacts to post new items into the user profile (known
asWall ). The usermay disable this, but only for all contacts or
none of them. Yet, for the visibility of such items, rich audi-
ence settings including subsets of one’s contacts are available.
As discussed with the sharing decisions, for all surveyed SNS
except Twitter, comments inherit the visibility setting of the
posted item they were appended to and have no distinct vis-
ibility setting. They may be removed manually by the user.
References created by other users of an SNS that point to a
user’s profile associate her presentation of self with external
content and lie outside of her manageable domain. Facebook
and Googleþ provide settings to control incoming references.
On Facebook, a setting is available to require user approval
before externally posted items referencing to the user’s profile
are shown to her contacts. Also, the visibility of such items
can be restricted to the previously discussed permission tar-
gets. On Googleþ, a similar setting exists, but additionally, the
user may specify a group of contacts whose references are
visible instantly without further approval. On Twitter,
external references to a profile are conducted simply by
including the name of the user-account in one of the text-
based posted items. Since all publicly posted items may be
searched for that account name, it is not technically feasible
to restrict references to a user-account on Twitter.
None of the proposed advanced controls for permission
assignment were implemented by the surveyed SNS with the
exception of Facebook providing a function to change the
audience of old posts to one’s contacts. The limitation of this
feature is that the audience cannot be specified more fine
grained.
6.5. Survey analysis and reflection
We see Facebook and Googleþ as providing the most
advanced SIdM settings and features among the surveyedttings for social identity management on Social Networking
formation Security Technical Report (2013), http://dx.doi.org/
i n f o rm a t i on s e c u r i t y t e c hn i c a l r e p o r t x x x ( 2 0 1 3 ) 1e1 412SNS. For Facebook, we reason that while being the market
leader, a corresponding amount of public scrutiny regarding
privacy settings has been a continuous force pushing toward
better SIdM controls. Several SIdM settings included in our
survey that Facebook provides have been introduced only
lately, with user assistance for creating circles being the most
recent example. Googleþ was launched at a time when this
ongoing trend was clearly observable already. Advanced SIdM
controls were necessary to compete on par with Facebook.
Diaspora’s SIdM controls are less rich which can be
explained by the prototypical character of the current imple-
mentation of the decentralized network. Also, one has to
consider that while Diaspora was designed with the goal of
improving privacy, the decentralized architecture is mostly
concerned with protecting user data from centralized SNS,
leaving SIdM a side issue.
The available SIdM settings on LinkedIn can be character-
ized as very limited. One might argue that the single purpose
of such an SNS might implicitly lead to using it only in the
proper context. However, we think that nowadays fast-paced
work environments with ever-changing business relation-
ships will eventually require advanced SIdM controls.
According to our reference framework, Twitter has the
least advanced SIdM controls. Yet, one has to consider that
while it fits the definition of an SNS, it can also be charac-
terized as a microblog with the focus on short, publicly
available status posts. Thus, for the purposes of many of its
users, more advanced SIdM controls might not even be
necessary.
Thus, the survey shows that differences in the extent to
which various SNS support SIdM can be observed.While some
SNS can be classified as providing very advanced SIdM con-
trols, there are still suggested SIdM features that have not
been implemented yet. We see room for improvements
especially in the dedicated support for multiple personas by
one SNS-account and in advanced privacy controls.
6.6. Research limitations
When developing the reference framework, we maintained a
clear focus on settings related to the management and selec-
tive disclosure of profile information to multiple contacts or
other users on the SNS. The possible disclosure of personal
information to other parties, such as the site operator, ad-
vertisers and application providers was out of scope.
We did not cover the adjacent topic of the usability of SIdM
settings to its full extent. It was only addressed briefly in
conjunction with assistance for the management of circles
(Setting 3c). The view on one’s profile from the perspective of
one’s contacts is also closely related to usability (Setting 1d).
We acknowledge that the usability of privacy controls greatly
influences the effectiveness of their usage and possibly
whether they are used at all. Yet, the assessment of an SNS’
usability cannot be performed as clear-cut as with the settings
presented in this work. A reliable usability assessment would
require further empirical studies.
So far, the reference framework allows for a qualitative
assessment of SIdM support by SNS. We suggest advancing
the reference framework toward a quantitative metric in the
following section.Please cite this article in press as: Riesner M, et al., Analyzing se
Sites: Classification, current state, and proposed developments, In
10.1016/j.istr.2013.02.0057. Toward a metric for assessing SIdM-
support of SNS
Aqualitative analysis of the capabilities for SIdM as performed
in Section 6 is only a first step toward a metric for assessing
and comparing various SNS in regards to their support for
SIdM. In contrast, a quantitative metric would enable a quick
classification and comparison of existing and newly intro-
duced SNS. Also, it would allow assessing quickly how new
SIdM settings impact the overall support of an SNS.
A naive bottom-up-approach for a quantitative assessment
would consist of simply adding up the level of fulfillment of
the SIdM settings, denoted by the circles in Table 6, resulting
in a score for each SNS. Omitting the high level-requirements,
which are aggregates of the fine-grained SIdM settings leaves
16 settings for which a score between 0 and 4 can each be
reached. Thus, the SIdM-support of a given SNS n could be
described by a score between 0 and 64. Factoring in that the
contribution of settings to SIdM may differ, the score for each
setting is further multiplied with a predefined setting-
dependent factor in this basic approach:
X
i¼1::s
settingscoreiðSNSnÞ  settingfactori
This approach does however not consider the in-
terdependencies between SIdM-features. As discussed in Sec-
tion 5, settings refine or contribute to other settings and may
even be interchangeable. A top-down-approach could consider
these observations by focusing on the four high-level re-
quirements. It could assign weights to the contribution of
particular SIdM-features to the high-level requirements and
deliver a score for each requirement. Further, analyzing the
interdependencies between the particular SIdM-features leads
to the observation that settings 1a (control over attribute
values) and 4b (fine grained sharing decisions) together have
transitive dependencies with all other features. They could be
used as a central measure for assessing the SIdM-capabilities
of an SNS. The other SIdM features would then influence the
final SIdM score based on the impact on settings 1a and 4b.
As noted before, SIdM-features are not always uniformly
available for all attributes on an SNS. Thus, it is feasible to
decrease an SNS’ score if it carries attributes for which some
SIdM-features are not available. This could be achieved by
calculating an independent SIdM-metric for each attribute in
an SNS and aggregating these numbers. Such an approach
raises the question of how to weigh the attributes, because
attributes on SNS differ in sensitivity of their values, relevance
and usage. While the sensitivity of an attribute could be pre-
defined, its usage and perceived sensitivity, and thus its
relevance for SIdM, depends largely on the user, the context
and individual SNS usage.
For instance, it is possible to assess the criticality especially
of static attributes such as the birthday or the email-address to
a certain extent. This is because such attributes are structured
and themeaning of their possible content is known in advance.
This allows to determine their inherent sensitivity and criti-
cally beforehand. Often, it is also possible to consider the
purpose and usage context of an SNS for the sensitivity of the
information expressed there. One might argue for examplettings for social identity management on Social Networking
formation Security Technical Report (2013), http://dx.doi.org/
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LinkedIn is less likely to compromise one’s privacy than in-
formation posted on a more leisure-oriented site such as
Facebook. Yet, it is necessary to consider the actual informa-
tion that is posted and its context, which cannot be anticipated
by the designer of an SIdM-metric. For instance, updating one’s
CV might hint at the intent of changing one’s occupation. Also
the content and criticality of attributeswith no fixed semantics
such as status updates varies widely. Therefore, to be individ-
ually applicable, a possible SIdM-metric has to be adjusted to
the usage patterns and preferences.
Hence, for assisting a potential SNS user evaluating a
particular site’s SIdMcapabilities, the SIdMmetric could be split
up into a general part and a customized user-dependent part.
Thegeneral partwouldmeasureSIdMcapabilities andcalculate
the score using predefinedweights for the particular attributes.
Thispart isgenerallyapplicable, doesnothave tobecustomized
to the user and could be published as a first reference.
For calculating the user-dependent part of the score,
weights are assigned to certain attributes and SIdM-settings
available for them. This requires additional information,
mainly consisting of the usage intensity and frequency of
each attribute and also the perceived criticality of the corre-
sponding value in regards to privacy. This information could
be queried using a basic tool asking the user for these values
for each attribute and calculating a customized SIdM assess-
ment for each SNS.
A more advanced version of the tool could even make use
of account data that is directly available through program-
ming interfaces from the SNS that are currently used. Thus
the tool would be able to assess the usage quantity of attri-
butes automatically and potentially achieve higher data
quality than a self-assessment by the user. Further, the user
could be queried about the criticality of particular posted
items.We expect this to lead to amore accurate assessment of
an attribute value’s criticality than querying only the user’s
stance on an attribute but not its actual value. An interactive
study on privacy expectations in SNS (Netter et al., 2013) has
shown that an interactive questionaire incorporating the
user’s SNS account data is a feasible way to query the user
about particular profile items.
These considerations lead to the outcome that deriving a
metric that evaluates the SIdM-capability of an SNS objec-
tively is a very challenging task. This is partly the result of the
differences between SNS and their attribute implementations.
Another reason is that such a metric would have to be
adjusted in order to be applicable to the particular user’s sit-
uation and usage. The proposed tool could aid users in
calculating a customized value for the SIdM capabilities of a
given site. A possible alternative for an SIdM-metric would be
the construction of a maturity model for the provider-support
for SIdM that doesn’t return numerical values, but only broad
maturity categories.8. Conclusions
Due to the increasing shift of social life to SNS, a large number
of personal information is available online. To manage their
identities online, users often rely on real-world heuristics andPlease cite this article in press as: Riesner M, et al., Analyzing se
Sites: Classification, current state, and proposed developments, In
10.1016/j.istr.2013.02.005norms of distribution such as spatial and temporal bound-
aries. However, these boundaries are no longer existent in SNS
due to the permanency of digitally mediated communication
and the presence of people from different social circles on one
platform.
To effectively manage social identities, online SNS service
providers have introduced a variety of settings, such as
limiting the visibility of the user’s profile. Over time, these
settings have evolved to complex privacy models which are
difficult to understand and differ between different SNS in
terminology used and amount of settings provided.
To facilitate understanding of required SIdM settings, in
this article we first derived high-level requirements for SIdM
from literature. These requirements were broken down into
concrete settings or features that stem from existing SNS or
were proposed by the authors, resulting in an SNS-
independent frame of reference for SIdM as the first contri-
bution. To evaluate its applicability, the frame of reference
was used to examine the SIdM capabilities of five selected
SNS, constituting the second contribution. Results showed
that popular SNS provide advanced SIdM settings, yet leave
room for improvements for managing multiple personas and
further advancing privacy controls.
Lastly, we discussed steps toward a quantitative metric to
assess the SIdM capabilities of existing and newly introduced
SNS and to facilitate their comparison. We identified issues
that have to be consideredwhen developing such ametric and
aim at refining it. Further future work consists of extending
the survey to additional SNS. Regarding existing SNS, the
ongoing evolution to multi-purpose SNS, i.e. having different
social circles on one platform, will increase incentives for SNS
service providers to cover the settings developed in the
reference framework for SIdM. Otherwise, users might limit
the personal information to the least common denominator
which is acceptable for all circles to avoid oversharing of in-
formation. Also, we aim at specifying the identified SIdM
settings on a more precise and technical level.r e f e r e n c e s
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